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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
is fairly certain to continue. Since the political realignment at the
close of the war, reaction to all governmental regulation of business
has been pronounced, and in that reaction, the Supreme Court has
enacted a significant role.24  Complacent acceptance of the catch-
phrases of the incumbent political leaders augurs the continuance of
judicial supremacy. Only a revision of personnel or, of what is less
likely, perspective, will ensure patches of another hue.25 Until then,
much remediable exploitation will continue, and those who echo the
demand for the status quo will unwittingly share the increased
cost imposed by lack of foresight.
V. J. K.
SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE BY PUBLICATION IN FORECLOSURE PRO-
CEEDINGS.--In 1912, a resident of Virginia, executed a mortgage for
$25,000. upon real property situated in Brooklyn, New York. Sev-
eral years later, after the death of the mortgagor, foreclosure pro-
ceedings were instituted by the holders of the mortgage. Application
was made to the Supreme Court for leave to serve the non-resident
heirs of the mortgagor by publication and an order was thereafter
duly entered directing that the summons be published for the requisite
number of times in two local newspapers, the "Brooklyn Daily Times"
and the "Brooklyn Citizen." The order also required the mailing of
copies in accordance with the provisions of the statute.' Through an
error of a clerk employed by the attorneys for plaintiffs in that action,
the advertisement was inserted in the "Brooklyn Daily Eagle"
instead of the "Brooklyn Daily Times," one of the two papers desig-
nated in the order for publication.
The heirs, all residents of Virginia, failed or neglected to appear
and judgment of foreclosure was entered by default, the property
bringing but $10,000. upon the sale. The mistake in publication was
not discovered until much later and was not rectified until 1924, when
plaintiffs in the foreclosure action procured an ex parte order amend-
ing nunc pro tunc the orddr of publication so that it read "Brooklyn
Daily Eagle" instead of "Brooklyn Daily Times," as originally.
' Professor Beard in his recent THE AMERICAN PARTY BATT=E has directed
attention to the resultant conservatism of all branches of government, and
particularly (p. 130) to the conservative leadership in the Court.
'Judge Hough's conclusion of but ten years ago, that "the courts, when
invoked to-day under the due-process clause, are doing little more than easing
the patient's later days," 32 Harv. L. Rev. at 233, is impossible of present
application. An entirely reasonable observation at the fiftieth anniversary of
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment has become unwarranted at the
sixtieth, yet the Court insists that "standards" have been maintained.
1 C. P. A., Sec. 232; General Rules of Practice, 50-52.
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Since the date of sale the property has greatly increased in value.
Improvements costing hundreds of thousands of dollars have been
made and it has undergone several subdivisions. During all this time
the non-resident heirs maintained a strict silence which was broken
only after all the details connected with the sale were fully consum-
mated and the property conveyed to new owners. Then for the first
time they contested the validity of the sale, alleging that failure of the
mortgagees to comply literally with the terms of the publication order,
rendered the sale void and wholly ineffectual for all purposes.2 They
admitted that they received in due course the notices which were sent
to them through the mails but contended that this did not amount to
legal notice and hence their equity of redemption is still intact.3 They
further alleged that the Court failed therefore to acquire jurisdiction
and unless the sale is set aside they will be deprived of valuable
property rights without due process of law, in contravention of both
Federal and State Constitutions.4
"It is an established principle in all courts that the method
of acquiring jurisdiction by publication is in derogation of the
common law, and that the statutory requirements must be
successively and accurately taken in order to confer on the
court jurisdiction over the defendant." "Recognizing this fact,
the courts quite uniformly hold that all of the statutory require-
ments for the institution and prosecution of such proceedings
and especially such as are of a jurisdictional character, must
be strictly and literally observed, in order that the judgment
entered thereon shall be of legal force and validity. Jurisdic-
tion is not to be assumed and exercised in such cases on the
general ground that the subject matter of the suit is within the
power of the Court. The inquiry must be as to whether the
requisites of the statute have been complied with, and such
compliance must appear on the record." r
Natural justice requires "that before the rights of an individual
can be bound by judicial sentence, he shall have notice." 6 The mere
fact that a defendant has knowledge of a suit pending against him is
not sufficient to give the court jurisdiction. 7
Legal notice according to the definition given in Words and
Phrases means something more than a mere knowledge of given facts.
"It is knowledge brought home to party in a prescribed form." But
"when its terms are so unambiguous that the meaning cannot without
negligence or inattention be misunderstood, the notice is sufficient.
'Valz v. Sheepshead Bay Bungalow Corp., 249 N. Y. 122 (1928).
3 7 R. C. L. 1039.
'United States Constitution, Art. 14, Sec. 1; Constitution of the State of
New York, Art. 1, Sec. 6.
' 21 R. C. L. 1293 and cases cited.
Supra, note 3 at 1031 and cases cited.TSupra, note 5.
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Defects in form, by which a party is not misled to his injury, do not
render a notice invalid." 8
The law respecting notice and the effect of irregularities is well
stated in the following extract from Corpus Juris-Cyc.
"The general rule in respect to notices is that mere infor-
malities do not vitiate them so long as they do not mislead, and
give the necessary information to the proper parties." 9
Of course where the statute prescribes a particular form of
notice, then as a general rule, the form of notice required must be
followed with reasonable strictness. But "if the notice required by
the statute emanates from an authentic source and is such as to
apprise the party to be notified fully of the whole substance of the
matters concerning which the statute required notice to be given, the
notice is ordinarily held sufficient."' 1
In Mishkind-Feinberg Realty Company v. Sidorsky,11 an action
to obtain judicial coristruction of a will, the summons was served by
publication. Instead of using the statutory words "Complaint hereto
annexed," the order was made to read, "Notice of object of action
hereto annexed." The Court in ruling out the objection to this
deviation from the requirements of the statute said: 12
"An action is commenced by the service of a summons
and by it a defendant is notified that his rights are challenged.
Service of the summons, that is, notice of the commencement
of the action and an opportunity for the defendant to appear
and defend his rights and interests, are the important prerequi-
sites to jurisdiction by a court." "Unimportant and unessential
variations from the form of notice prescribed not affecting the
substantial rights of the defendant are irregularities which
may be cured by amendment pursuant to the general authority
of the court to amend a process, pleading or other proceeding
in furtherance of justice."
In Loring v. Binney,' 3 a similar case, the proper papers were
mailed to each of the non-resident defendants and the summons with
a notice attached was published in the designated papers. This notice
was defective in two respects. It was not directed solely to the
defendants who were to be served by publication and it erroneously
'5 Words and Phrases, 4066.
'29 Cyc. Law Procedure, 1117.
"43 Utah 515, 520, 136 Pacific 965, 966 (1913). This was an action
involving the right to appeal from a judgment. A letter addressed to plaintiff's
attorney giving the particulars of the judgment was held to be sufficient com-
pliance with a statute requiring notice of entry; citing Fry v. Bennett, 7 Abb.
Prac. (N. Y.) 352 (1858).
"189 N. Y. 402, 82 N. E. 448 (1907).
'"Ibid., 406.
"38 Hun. 152, aff'd 101 N. Y. 623 (1885).
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stated that it was served pursuant to section 443 of the Code instead
of 442.
The Court held these irregularities to be immaterial because:
"The substantial objects intended to be accomplished by
the notice were accordingly secured even if the defendant
relied upon the publication itself, for it clearly appeared from
it that the publication was made under and by virtue of the
authority vested in the judges of the court over this subject
* * * failure literally to comply with the directions concerning
the form of the notice which was to be published, but not in
fact served or required to be served, upon either of the defend-
ants, was no more than an irregularity which would not deprive
the Court of the jurisdiction obtained by the service of the
summons in compliance with the directions of the order for its
publication." 14
The situation in this case is analogous. In fact there is not any
practical difference between the two since the question presented is, in
both cases, identical. This error could by no possibility affect any
substantial right of these plaintiffs, for notwithstanding the defect in
notice, they were supplied with complete information either by the
summons and notice as they were published or by the copies of the
papers which were mailed to them, that their rights were being chal-
lenged by an action against them in which judgment would be
obtained by default if they failed to appear.15
"The administration of justice should be free from traps,
and technical obstacles ought not to be thrown in the path of
those who in good faith rely upon the judicial machinery which
they find in operation." 16
But precedent, always a strong factor in any case, is a very
difficult thing to overcome. Tradition dies hard and until recently-
"most of our States have done nothing to ameliorate the absurd
and frightful consequences flowing from a want of jurisdiction over
the subject matter." 17 The concept of jurisdiction became a judicial
taboo. The rule of strict construction, having once found its way
into the law, was not to be questioned. Let it once be known fhat a
party to a suit had failed to follow the procedure outlined by the
statute and his case was lost. Good faith, diligence, economic advan-
tage, all these counted for nothing in the face of -this devastating
logic. By steadfast adherence to the narrow interpretation of legis-
- Ibid., 155.
- Ibid., 156.
" Sunderland's Problem of Jurisdiction, 4 Texas Law Review 429, 434
(1926).
-7 Ibid., 437.
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lative intent, the courts lost sight of the true purpose of process and
service.
The Legislature in enacting the statute involved did not require
that notice be published in certain specified newspapers but left the
matter of selection to the discretion of the trial courts.18 The pur-
pose of the statute, namely, that notice may reach the party intended
should be kept in view.19 No merely formal objection of any kind
should be tenable and the substantial and only question in any case
should be whether the purpose was sufficiently well served. It ought
to be a matter of indifference as to how a notice arrives if the fact of
its delivery is the substantial end to be accomplished.2 0  "The inquiry
must be as to whether the requisites of the statute have been complied
with * * *." 21 There is not, nor could there with propriety be, a
claim that this avowed purpose has not been fulfilled by publication
in a journal other than the one selected. The "Brooklyn Daily Eagle"
has its offices and is printed in the same vicinity as the "Brooklyn
Times" and enjoys a wider, larger circulation over practically the
same territory. The plaintiffs have received actual notice of the
commencement of the action; they were therefore fairly and fully
apprised that their rights would be cut off by a judgment against
them if they did not appear and defend the action. Realizing, how-
ever, that the equity of redemption was then valueless they chose to
remain silent and did not take any steps whatever to preserve their
interests. Now after a lapse of years they claim that because of a
purely technical defect in service of the summons they have been
deprived of property in violation of their constitutional rights.
There is little, if any merit to the complaint but plaintiffs seeing
an opportunity to reap a rich financial harvest endeavored to take
advantage of an irregularity by contesting defendants' title. How
near they came to succeeding is best shown by the divided opinion of
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment for defendant by
a four to three vote, Cardozo, Ch. J., Pound and Kellogg, JI., dis-
senting upon the ground that the trial Court did not acquire juris-
diction.22
There is no equitable right that can be urged in plaintiff's behalf,
in fact Judge Lehman's opinion very clearly indicates that the circum-
stances of the case were a decisive factor in the determination of
the appeal. However, if the Court failed to acquire jurisdiction,
then of course, no amount of tardiness in preserving their rights
' Supra, note 1, Sec. 234.
uSupra, note 5 at 1302, citing Lynn v. Allen, 145 Ind. 584, 44 N. E. 646,
33 L. R. A. 779 (1896).
=o Supra, note 16 at 444.
Supra, note 5.
-Supra, note 2 at 139.
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would constitute laches and plaintiffs could not be estopped from
pleading their claim.23
"There can be no estoppel based upon failure of the non-
resident defendants, named in the foreclosure action, either to
appear in that action or to take other steps to assert -their
rights to the property under foreclosure unless some duty to
act * * * was placed upon such defendants. If they received
legal notice * * * then the Court had jurisdiction * * *. If they
had no such notice then it seems clear that they were under no
duty to assert their rights until they chose to do so." 24
In the light of the authorities cited it would seem that plaintiffs
had not only actual but legal notice and that their rights were properly
disposed of by a court of competent jurisdiction. There is little
likelihood that they even knew of the defect until it was called to their
attention long after the matter was closed.
State courts have very broad powers of jurisdiction regarding
property within their territorial limits.25 "In order to determine the
questions of title to real estate lying within their jurisdiction, con-
forming to such statutory procedure as may have been enacted, they
may include as parties non-residents and aliens, and may make decrees
disposing of their rights whether they appear or not." 26
Since it is the province of the Court to determine the periodicals
in which the notices are to be inserted, there is no just reason why it
cannot correct a defect by amending its order so that a newspaper
which it might have chosen in the first instance is substituted for the
one originally named. No injustice is done to plaintiff by reason
thereof; failure or refusal to do so would work a very great hardship
upon defendants and subject them to a huge financial loss.
Plaintiffs, in a vain attempt to strengthen their case, point out
to the Court that if the verdict of the trial Court and of the Appellate
Division is sustained, persons may then without fear disregard the
instructions of the trial Judge and use papers of their own choice.
The danger of abuse in this regard is, however, very slight and is
materially lessened, if not wholly dispelled by Judge Lehman's opin-
ion which is so worded that it may be relied upon as authority to
frustrate any attempt in this direction.
This commendable decision is consistent with the "tendency of
modem decisions to enlarge the definition of jurisdiction to make it
include not only the power to hear and determine in a certain class
of cases, but also the power to render judgment in the particular
case." 27
JA. M.
15 Corpus Juris 737 *** * if neither the person nor the subject-matter
is within the jurisdiction of the court, it has no power over them."
"' Supra, note 2 at 132.
" Supra, note 3 at 1042, citing Smith v. Eaton, 36 Me. 298, 58 Am. Dec.
746 (1853); Wimer v. Wimer, 82 Va. 890, 5 S. E. 536 (1886).
' Barry, Jurisdiction over Non-Residents, 13 Va. Law Rev. 175, 176 (1927).
' Supra, note 3 at p. 1029.
